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Executive Summary
Over the past decade, migration flows between the United States and Mexico have changed
dramatically. The migration relationship between the two countries was once dominated by irregular
flows from Mexico to the United States, but today most Mexicans move to the United States legally. The
overall population of Mexicans in the United States has also been shrinking since 2014, though at 11.3
million people in 2017, they still make up the largest immigrant group in the country and 3 percent of
the overall population. At the same time, the population of U.S. citizens living in Mexico has grown to
more than 700,000, making it the largest population of U.S. emigrants anywhere in the world. A large
percentage of these U.S citizens are children who were born in the United States, and many may face
integration obstacles in Mexican schools and society, much as Mexican immigrant children often do in
the United States.

Today, the largest migration flow between the two countries—and the most difficult to manage—is that
of Central Americans heading north to the United States, with increasing numbers staying in Mexico
along the way. Unlike the large numbers of Mexicans crossing the shared border in the late 1990s and
early 2000s, most of whom were single, adult men, these Central Americans are mostly families and
unaccompanied children, and many are seeking asylum. The large Central American flows through
the region, which grew noticeably in late 2018 and early 2019, are accompanied by smaller but not
insignificant migration from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and several Asian and African countries.

Many of the challenges that Mexico and the United States face
around migration are surprisingly similar today.
But even as the migration landscape across the region has changed, and Mexico has increasingly
become a destination as well as a transit country, policy has not always kept pace. Many of the
challenges that Mexico and the United States face around migration are surprisingly similar today.
Both have large numbers of each other’s citizens living in their country and attending their schools,
as well as immigrants from elsewhere, and they need to think proactively about how to best support
the integration of immigrants into local communities. Their governments each have significant
opportunities to engage with civil society and the private sector to ensure that integration works in
favor of economic growth and successful social outcomes for the societies at large. And given the size of
the U.S.-citizen population in Mexico and the Mexican-citizen population in the United States, there are
important opportunities for U.S. and Mexican policymakers to learn from each other.

The current political moment may not seem propitious for real cooperation between the two federal
governments. The sharp increase in mixed migration from Central America, and rising arrivals at
the Mexico-U.S. border, have created deep tensions between the two governments, with the Trump
administration threatening tariffs on Mexican goods in May and early June to force the Mexican
government to ramp up immigration enforcement. But the divisive political rhetoric and threats
obscure the degree to which the two countries are converging in terms of the real challenges—and
real opportunities—they face in dealing with migration issues. Even today there is enormous space for
engagement between local and state governments on both sides of the border, as there is for civil-society
organizations, the business community, and even for many federal government agencies.
This is also the time to begin to visualize a different kind of binational policy that could reflect the real
complementariness that exists between Mexico and the United States on migration issues, even if it may
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be difficult to implement in the current environment. This pursuit of a new vision for policymaking, one
grounded in the new migration realities in the region, led the Migration Policy Institute and El Colegio de
México in late 2018 and early 2019 to convene a Study Group on Mexico-U.S. Migration. These discussions
among policymakers, researchers, and representatives of civil society and the private sector informed the
analysis of migration trends and policy options presented in this report.

Policy Options and Recommendations

 There is no way to effectively address regional mixed migration without a regional approach.
As both Mexico and the United States face the challenge of managing large-scale mixed migration
from Central America and elsewhere, U.S. policymakers would be wise to engage Mexico in ways
that are mutually beneficial rather than seeking to impose unilateral measures that undermine
cooperation, as has happened in recent months. These include working with the Mexican
government to modernize and professionalize its migration and asylum institutions, while doing
the same in the United States. And while cooperation between Mexico and the United States is
paramount, broader regional cooperation is also vital to comprehensively addressing the various
forces driving irregular migration.
 Mexico and the United States should share a common aim of replacing irregular flows with
regular migration. Doing this effectively requires a mix of strategies in each country that include
expanding existing legal pathways or creating new ones, reforming asylum systems, enhancing
border control, and addressing the root causes of migration. It is unlikely that enforcement alone,
even if strengthened in both countries, will dissuade irregular migration in a sustainable way,
absent significant reforms to visa systems and robust protection mechanisms for those fleeing
persecution and generalized violence.

 No policy area needs more urgent attention in both countries than asylum reform. Asylum
seekers currently face long and growing application backlogs, stretching for months in Mexico
and years in the United States. Reforming both asylum systems to enable timely decision-making
would both ensure that those who qualify receive protection quickly and discourage the filing of
less robust claims. Attempts to limit access to asylum (such as forcing those seeking asylum in the
United States to wait in Mexico or metering at the border) are likely to backfire by strengthening
smuggling networks and encouraging irregular crossings. And seeking to outsource responsibility
for providing humanitarian protection to Mexico or other countries in the region is unlikely to
result in either relief for those in need or deterrence of future migration. In Mexico, strengthening
the asylum system requires at least tripling the relatively modest annual budget of the Mexican
asylum agency (Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados, or COMAR). Meanwhile, in the United
States, this would mean creating a much more efficient system, perhaps by allowing asylum
officers to make the final decision in cases.

 Building effective institutions that can implement immigration policies matters. Mexico’s
National Migration Institute (Instituto Nacional de Migración, or INM) remains underfunded and
its policies and infrastructure limited, with no dependable career path for agents and other staff,
limited controls to prevent corruption, few clear protocols for key functions, and substandard
detention facilities for those awaiting asylum or removal. While U.S. immigration agencies have
received more funding than other federal law enforcement functions, their design in some
respects still reflects a different era when most unauthorized immigrants were single, adult men
from Mexico. Rethinking physical infrastructure for detention centers, career paths within border
agencies, and the structure of ports of entry would help improve legal transit and commerce while
responding more effectively to mixed flows of humanitarian and other migrants, and especially
the needs of families and children traveling alone.
 It is time to build a truly 21st-century border. Both countries also have an interest in managing
the shared border in a way that is binational and cooperative, something that has increasingly
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been happening for many years. They have a joint interest in efficiently facilitating the regular
movement of goods and people across the border, while preventing migrant smuggling, drug
trafficking, and weapons smuggling. Building on the successes to date entails employing riskmanagement techniques effectively, expanding trusted traveler and shipper programs and preclearance programs, enhancing information-sharing efforts (including the integration of entry/
exit data), and creating unified systems for cargo processing.

 Both countries should rethink their approach to employment-based immigration to create
alternatives to irregular migration. For Mexico, regional employment-based visas that enable
some Central Americans to work in the country’s southern states are a start, but most labor
needs are in the center and northern regions; the Mexican government may wish to expand
this program or launch one that focuses on those regions, while ensuring fair wages and labor
protections. In the United States, employment-based visas for agricultural and nonagricultural
workers (H-2A and H-2B) have provided legal pathways for many Mexicans to work seasonally,
but they have admitted far fewer Central Americans. One option to encourage employers in these
demand-driven programs to request Central American workers is to create recruitment centers
in the region. Future immigration reform efforts in the United States should also look seriously at
alternative ways of creating employment-based visas open to Central American workers.

 Together, the U.S. and Mexican governments should make it a priority to identify, disrupt, and
degrade large migrant smuggling organizations. This is especially the case for those that are
engaged in human trafficking and those that are known to prey on migrants. In the United States,
this may require direct policy guidance, such as a national security directive, that focuses priority
attention on migrant smuggling networks.
 Supporting the development of the economies, governance, and institutional infrastructure
of migrant origin countries is critical to addressing the root causes of migration. While U.S.
and Mexican development priorities differ, identifying two or three common objectives could
maximize impact in those areas. This could include supporting reform efforts for public security
and governance or economic development initiatives in Central America, in cooperation with
local partners. In Venezuela and Nicaragua, where political crises have given rise to large-scale
emigration, this could mean strengthening democratic institutions so that the countries’ citizens
have a true say in the future of their governments.

 Both the United States and Mexico should strive to be welcoming societies to each other’s
nationals, as well as to immigrants from around the world. Regardless of the divisive nature of
immigration policy debates, society as a whole benefits when newcomers are well-integrated in
labor markets, school and health systems, and the public sphere. There are many opportunities
for governments, civil society, and the private sector in Mexico and the United States to learn from
each other’s experiences and share policy ideas in fields such as education and workforce training.
This is particularly the case since each country’s largest immigrant group is the other’s nationals.

These ideas can galvanize policymakers and the wider public in both the United States and Mexico to
think differently about how migration patterns have changed and how to seize the growing range of
possibilities for collaboration on migration issues. The opportunities for real, sustainable collaboration
are immense, even if not all of them can be realized in the short term.

I.

Introduction

The current moment, rife with divisive political rhetoric, may seem ill suited to efforts to deepen
cooperation between Mexico and the United States on migration issues. Yet this obscures an important
reality: these countries are converging in terms of the migration challenges—and opportunities—they
Changing Mexico-U.S. Migration Patterns and Opportunities for Sustainable Cooperation
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face. Even today, there is room for cross-border engagement at different levels of government, and for
efforts to visualize a different kind of bilateral cooperation for the future.

To improve understanding of the changing migration landscape and begin to develop a shared vision
for future cooperation, El Colegio de México and the Migration Policy Institute convened a Study Group
on Mexico-U.S. Migration in late 2018 and early 2019. The group’s members, a full list of whom can be
found in the Appendix, include leading experts from government, academia, civil society, and the private
sector. Their rich discussions of changing migration patterns and policy options for the management of
migration between the two countries informed this report.

Even today, there is room for cross-border engagement at
different levels of government, and for efforts to visualize a
different kind of bilateral cooperation for the future.
The first part of this report explores the ways migration patterns between Mexico, the United States, and
the broader region have shifted over the past decade. These data show dramatic changes that upend longheld assumptions on both sides of the border. The second part of the report lays out a series of policy
ideas and recommendations for how the U.S. and Mexican governments could find common ground on
migration issues, with a mix of options for immediate action and others that require a longer timeframe
for implementation.

II.

Shifting Migration Patterns

Migration trends between Mexico and the United States have changed considerably since 2010. Mexican
migration, which once dominated the debate between the two countries, has dropped dramatically, while
migration from the United States to Mexico has increased. And flows from Central America and other
countries, both inside and outside the hemisphere, have become considerably more important in recent
years. While most of these migrants are trying to reach the United States, they cross through Mexico and
appear to be staying in Mexico in increasing numbers.

A.

Mexican Migration to the United States

Having grown steadily in size since the 1980s, the Mexican immigrant population in the United States hit
a turning point in 2010. Even as the total number of immigrants in the country continued to increase each
year between 2010 and 2017, the Mexican immigrant population did not. The number of Mexicans in
the United States first leveled out and then, in 2014, began to decline, falling from 11.7 million in 2010 to
11.3 million in 2017 (see Figure 1). This shift was particularly pronounced in the year between 2016 and
2017, when the number of Mexicans in the United States decreased by about 300,000.1

1

4

Jie Zong and Jeanne Batalova, “Mexican Immigrants in the United States,” Migration Information Source, October 11, 2018,
www.migrationpolicy.org/article/mexican-immigrants-united-states.
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Number of Mexican
Immigrants (in millions)

Figure 1. Mexican Immigrant Population in the United States, 1980–2017
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Sources: Migration Policy Institute (MPI) calculations of U.S. Census Bureau 2010 and 2017 American
Community Surveys (ACS); Campbell J. Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on the ForeignBorn Population of the United States: 1850–2000” (Working Paper no. 81, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington,
DC, February 2006), www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0081/twps0081.pdf.

Despite this decrease in population size, Mexicans remain the largest single foreign-born group in the
United States, accounting for 25 percent of the 44.5 million immigrants in the country as of 2017 (see
Figure 2). Many Mexican immigrants have deep roots in the country, with 89 percent having entered
before 2010, compared to 79 percent of the total immigrant population. And more than half of Mexican
immigrants in the United States entered before 2000.
Figure 2. Immigrant Population in the United States, by Country of Birth, 2010 and 2017
2010
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Mexico
25%

Mexico
29%
China 5%
All Others
54%

India 4%
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Vietnam
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Source: MPI calculations based on ACS data for 2010 and 2017.
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Recent Mexican immigrants—those who entered in the past five years—are much more likely to have
a college education than those who arrived in previous years.2 In 2017, 17 percent of recent Mexican
immigrants were college educated, up from 10 percent in 2010 and well above the 7 percent of the overall
Mexican immigrant population with a college degree in 2017 (see Figure 3). This suggests the human
capital profile of Mexican immigrants is changing, as it is for the overall immigrant population.
Figure 3. Share of Immigrant Adults (ages 25 and older) with a Bachelor’s Degree or Higher, by Country
of Birth and Years of U.S. Residence, 2005–17
2017
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2010
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All Mexican immigrants

Source: MPI calculations based on ACS data for 2005, 2010, 2015, and 2017.

These changes in the Mexican immigrant population in the United States are closely linked to decreasing
flows from Mexico to the United States—and, notably, it appears that larger shares of Mexican immigrants
are entering the country through legal rather than illegal channels. These trends are also shaped by return
migration to Mexico (discussed in the next section). In 2013, India and China surpassed Mexico as the
top origin countries for recent arrivals, and more recent data show the trend continuing: Approximately
150,000 Mexican migrants arrived in the United States in 2016, compared to 175,000 Indian migrants and
160,000 migrants from China/Hong Kong.3
The number of Mexicans obtaining lawful permanent resident (LPR) status, also known as a green card,
provides another window into Mexican legal migration flows to the United States, though they include not
only new arrivals but also immigrants who adjust status from inside the country. After falling somewhat
since fiscal year (FY) 2008, the number of Mexicans obtaining green cards began to increase again in
FY 2015 (see Figure 4). By FY 2016, the number of Mexicans becoming LPRs had reached 175,000,
approaching FY 2008 levels, though this number dipped slightly to 171,000 in FY 2017.

2
3

6

Ariel G. Ruiz Soto and Andrew Selee, A Profile of Highly Skilled Mexican Immigrants in Texas and the United States
(Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2019), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/highly-skilled-mexican-immigrantstexas-united-states.
Eric B. Jensen, Anthony Knapp, C. Peter Borsella, and Kathleen Nestor, “The Place-of-Birth Composition of Immigrants to
the United States: 2000 to 2013” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of America, San
Diego, CA, April 30–May 2, 2015), https://paa2015.princeton.edu/abstracts/150959; Jie Zong, Jeanne Batalova, and Jeffrey
Hallock, “Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United States,” Migration Information Source,
February 8, 2018, www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-unitedstates-7.
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Figure 4. Number of Mexicans Obtaining Lawful Permanent Resident Status, FY 2008–17
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Note: These data are for U.S. federal government fiscal years, which run from October 1 through September 30.
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2017,” accessed
November 21, 2018, www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2017.

Among temporary Mexican immigrants, most came through one of three visa categories: H-2A
(agricultural workers); H-2B (nonagricultural workers); and TN and TD (NAFTA visas for Canadian
and Mexican professional workers). The number of Mexicans issued these visa types has expanded
significantly over the past ten years, most notably for H-2A visas (see Figure 5). In fact, Mexicans
accounted for 74 percent of H-2B visas issued in FY 2018 and more than 90 percent of H-2A, TN, and TD
visas.4

Number of Visas Issued
(in thousands)

Figure 5. Select Nonimmigrant Visas Issued to Mexicans, By Visa Class, FY 2005–18
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Note: These data are for U.S. federal government fiscal years, which run from October 1 through September 30.
Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Nonimmigrant Visa Issuances by Visa Class and
by Nationality, FY1997-2018,” accessed April 11, 2019, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/
visa-statistics/nonimmigrant-visa-statistics.html.
4

Migration Policy Institute (MPI) calculations based on data from the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs,
“Nonimmigrant Visa Issuances by Visa Class and by Nationality, FY1997-2018,” accessed April 11, 2019, https://travel.state.
gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visa-statistics/nonimmigrant-visa-statistics.html.
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The majority of Mexican immigrants in the United States are in the country lawfully. As of 2016, 23
percent of Mexican immigrants were naturalized citizens, 32 percent held a green card or a temporary
visa, and 45 percent were unauthorized (see Figure 6).
Figure 6. Mexican Immigrant Population in the United States, by Immigration Status, 2012–16

Naturalized
Citizens
23%

Unauthorized
Immigrants
45%

LPRs + Other Legal
Immigrants
32%

LPRs = Lawful permanent residents.
Sources: MPI analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data from the 2012–16 ACS pooled and the 2008 Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP), drawing on a unique methodology for assigning legal status to
noncitizens developed in consultation with James Bachmeier of Temple University and Jennifer Van Hook of
The Pennsylvania State University, Population Research Institute.

As of April 2019, roughly 536,000 Mexican unauthorized immigrants had legal protection from
deportation and work authorization under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program.5
Among unauthorized immigrants who meet all DACA program criteria, those from Mexico participate
at the highest rate; MPI estimates that approximately 821,000 Mexicans were immediately eligible as of
August 2018, of whom 68 percent were DACA recipients.6

While there are no accurate statistics on the number of immigrants who successfully enter the United
States without authorization, data show that the number of Mexican immigrants apprehended by the U.S.
Border Patrol has declined dramatically since 2007, reaching levels not seen since the early 1970s.7 And
even with the large rise in recent years in overall apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico border, apprehensions
of Mexican nationals remain historically low, at less than 200,000 annually since FY 2015.8 A 2017 study
by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) calculates that ever fewer unauthorized immigrants
succeed in entering the United States through the southwest border, so the total number of illegal
5
6
7
8

8

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), “Approximate Active DACA Recipients: Country of Birth As of April 30,
2019,” accessed August 28, 2019, www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/
Immigration%20Forms%20Data/All%20Form%20Types/DACA/Approximate_Active_DACA_Recipients_Demographics_-_
Apr_30_2019.pdf.
MPI Migration Data Hub, “Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Data Tools,” accessed November 21, 2018, www.
migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca-profiles.
Jens Manuel Krogstad and Jeffrey S. Passel, “U.S. Border Apprehensions of Mexicans Fall to Historic Lows,” Pew Research
Center Fact Tank, December 30, 2014, www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/30/u-s-border-apprehensions-ofmexicans-fall-to-historic-lows/.
U.S. Border Patrol, “U.S. Border Patrol Apprehensions From Mexico and Other Than Mexico (FY 2000 - FY 2018),” accessed
September 10, 2019, www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2019-Mar/bp-total-apps-other-mexico-fy2000fy2018.pdf.

Changing Mexico-U.S. Migration Patterns and Opportunities for Sustainable Cooperation

MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE

crossings by Mexican migrants has probably dropped even quicker than apprehension statistics suggest.9
Today, 62 percent of all unauthorized immigrants (Mexicans and others) have lived in the United States
for a decade or more.10

Overall, Mexican irregular migration to the United States has slowed while the number of Mexicans
to receive green cards and temporary worker visas each year has increased. This shift has been
accompanied by an increase in education levels among recent arrivals. But while Mexicans are still the
largest foreign-born population in the United States, their share of all immigrants is smaller than in past
decades, and especially among recent arrivals, as other countries have overtaken Mexico as the top origin
country.

B.

Mexican Returnees and U.S. Citizens in Mexico

As migration from Mexico to the United States has been decreasing, more Mexican immigrants (and their
U.S.-born children) are returning to Mexico, according to analyses of Mexican census data.11 Between
2005 and 2010, more than 820,000 Mexican nationals returned to Mexico and another 443,000 between
2010 and 2015. By comparison, 266,000 Mexicans returned between 1995 and 2000 (see Figure 7).
Number of Mexican
Returnees (in thousands)

Figure 7. Mexican Returnees, by Period of Return, 1995–2015
900
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Source: Claudia Masferrer, “Return Migration from the U.S. to Mexico: New Challenges of an Old
Phenomenon,” in Migration Challenges in North America: People, Labor, Borders & Security, ed. Canadian
Diversity (Montreal: Association for Canadian Studies, 2018), www.ciim.ca/img/boutiquePDF/canadiandiversityvol15-no2-2018-9jf51.pdf.

Research suggests that voluntary and involuntary return migration to Mexico is driven by a mix of
factors, including the slow recovery of the U.S. economy after the Great Recession, increased optimism
about the Mexican economy, and stricter immigration policies in the U.S. interior and at the southwest
border. Deportations of Mexicans from the United States decreased gradually from 602,000 in FY 2009
to 207,000 in FY 2015, remaining relatively constant thereafter with an annual average of about 200,000
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Efforts by DHS to Estimate Southwest Border Security Between Ports of Entry
(Washington, DC: DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, 2017), www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0914_
estimates-of-border-security.pdf.
10 MPI Data Hub, “Profile of the Unauthorized Population: United States,” accessed September 11, 2019, www.migrationpolicy.
org/data/unauthorized-immigrant-population/state/US.
11 Claudia Masferrer, “Return Migration from the U.S. to Mexico: New Challenges of an Old Phenomenon,” in Migration
Challenges in North America: People, Labor, Borders & Security, ed. Canadian Diversity (Montreal: Association for Canadian
Studies, 2018), www.ciim.ca/img/boutiquePDF/canadiandiversity-vol15-no2-2018-9jf51.pdf.
9
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through FY 2018.12 Some analysts, drawing on Mexican survey data, contend that most Mexicans who
returned from the United States prior to 2015 left voluntarily, with more than half of returnees citing
family reunification as their motivation to return.13 At the same time, the Mexican- and U.S.-citizen
relatives of deportees and voluntary returnees may also decide to leave the United States and rejoin them
in Mexico.
Among Mexican adults repatriated from the United States, decision-making about the future also appears
to be changing. According to analyses of representative survey data, the share of Mexican adult deportees
indicating they intended to re-enter the United States plummeted from 95 percent in 2005 to 49 percent
in 2015. By comparison, the share of those intending to remain in Mexico increased from 5 percent in
2005 to 47 percent in 2015.14
At the same time, the U.S.-born population in Mexico has grown rapidly, in part as a result of Mexican
parents returning to the country with their U.S.-born children. This phenomenon highlights new forms
of transnational families: Although the majority of U.S.-born children in Mexico (age 18 and younger) live
with two Mexican-born parents, one-third were recorded as living separate from one or both parents in
2015.15

The U.S.-born population in Mexico has grown rapidly, in part
as a result of Mexican parents returning to the country with
their U.S.-born children.

Mexican census data show immigration of U.S.-born persons increasing significantly in the late 1990s
and early 2000s. The number of U.S.-born recent immigrants in Mexico (that is, those who were living
in the United States five years prior to the survey) peaked in 2005–10 at approximately 356,000, before
decreasing to about 218,000 in 2010–15, though this remains above pre-2000 levels. Among the broader
population moving from the United States to Mexico, children make up most of the U.S.-born recent
immigrant population in each time period, while most recent Mexican returnees are adults (see Figure 8).

12 Mexican Interior Ministry (SEGOB), “Boletín Mensual de Estadísticas Migratorias, 2008–18,” accessed September 10, 2019,
http://portales.segob.gob.mx/es/PoliticaMigratoria/Boletines_Estadisticos.
13 Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, More Mexicans Leaving than Coming to the U.S. (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2015), www.
pewhispanic.org/2015/11/19/more-mexicans-leaving-than-coming-to-the-u-s/.
14 To analyze the demographic profile of repatriated Mexican adults, MPI researchers applied results from the Mexican
Northern Border Migration Survey (Encuesta sobre Migracíon en la Frontera Norte de México) to official repatriation data
collected by Mexico’s Interior Ministry. See Ryan Schultheis and Ariel G. Ruiz Soto, A Revolving Door No More? A Statistical
Profile of Mexican Adults Repatriated from the United States (Washington, DC: MPI, 2017), www.migrationpolicy.org/
research/revolving-door-no-more-statistical-profile-mexican-adults-repatriated-united-states.
15 Claudia Masferrer, Erin Hamilton, and Nicole Denier, “Immigrants in Their Parental Homeland: Half a Million U.S.-Born Minors Settle throughout Mexico,” Demography 56, no. 4 (2019): 1453–61.
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Recent Migrants (in thousands)

Figure 8. Recent Mexican Returnees and U.S.-Born Immigrants* in Mexico, by Period of Arrival, 1985–
2015
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* Drawing on Mexican census data, “recent returnees” and “recent immigrants” refer to persons living in Mexico
at the time of the survey who were recorded as living in the United States five years prior.
Source: Silvia E. Giorguli-Saucedo, Víctor M. García Guerrero, and Claudia Masferrer, A Migration System
in the Making: Demographic Dynamics and Migration Policies in North America and the Northern Triangle of
Central-America (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2016), https://cedua.colmex.mx/images/_micrositios/
amsitm/amsitm-policy-paper.pdf.

These flows of U.S.-born migrants have added to the stock of immigrants in Mexico. The immigrant
population in the country doubled between 2000 and 2013, rising from 521,000 to 1.1 million.16 By 2015,
approximately 740,000 U.S.-born migrants lived in Mexico, representing 73 percent of the country’s
1 million immigrants.17 Yet, according to U.S. State Department calculations, the U.S.-born immigrant
population in Mexico may be much higher.18 Among U.S.-born children living in Mexico, an estimated
30,000 lack Mexican identity documents—something that can complicate their access to schools and
other services.19

Undoubtedly, given the current levels of migration from the United States to Mexico, reintegrating
returning Mexicans and their U.S.-born children will continue to be a critical challenge for both
governments, as well as the growing network of civil-society organizations dedicated to migrant issues.
Efforts to implement existing government programs uniformly across Mexico and to enhance the capacity
of civil-society services can make positive contributions in the short term. While many reintegration

16 Silvia E. Giorguli-Saucedo, Víctor M. García Guerrero, and Claudia Masferrer, A Migration System in the Making: Demographic
Dynamics and Migration Policies in North America and the Northern Triangle of Central-America (Mexico City: El Colegio de
México, October 2016), https://cedua.colmex.mx/images/_micrositios/amsitm/amsitm-policy-paper.pdf.
17 Mexican National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), “Tabulados de la Encuesta Intercensal 2015,” updated
October 24, 2016, www.inegi.org.mx/contenidos/programas/intercensal/2015/tabulados/04_migracion.xls.
18 The U.S. State Department lists 1.5 million U.S. citizens living in Mexico on its website, and embassy officials have commented
that the real number may be 1.5 to 1.8 million, though it is hard to verify these figures. See U.S. Department of State,
“U.S. Relations with Mexico,” updated April 1, 2019, www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-mexico/; remarks by former U.S.
Ambassador Roberta Jacobson at the MPI event “Vanishing Frontiers: The Forces Driving Mexico and the United States
Together,” Washington, DC, June 5, 2018, www.migrationpolicy.org/events/vanishing-frontiers-forces-driving-mexico-andunited-states-together.
19 U.S. Embassy in Mexico, “Niños Migrantes son Prioridad para Consulado,” updated August 12, 2015, https://mx.usembassy.
gov/es/ninos-migrantes-son-prioridad-para-consulado/.
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programs currently focus on helping returnees find employment, over the long term, these services
should seek to address a wider range of needs, including by supporting education attainment and
psychosocial wellbeing.20

C.

Migration from Central America to Mexico and the United States

Central American migration from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to Mexico and the United
States is hardly new, but current emigration levels have fundamentally reshaped regional flows. A
mixture of extreme violence, poverty, drought, poor coffee harvests, and worsening political conditions
(in Honduras and to some extent in Guatemala) have created powerful push factors driving Central
Americans to leave their countries. U.S. immigration laws and the desire to reunify with family already
in the United States have provided powerful pull factors, and policy missteps in the United States and
Mexico have exacerbated these forces. However, the interplay of push and pull factors has manifested
differently in each of these three countries, with Guatemalans and Hondurans dominating migration
flows in FY 2018–19.21
At the U.S. southwest border, apprehensions of Mexican migrants by U.S. authorities have fallen over
the past ten years. Meanwhile, in FY 2012 apprehensions of migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras began to rise significantly, reaching record levels in FY 2019 (see Figure 9). Through
the first eleven months of FY 2019, migrants from these countries were apprehended at the border
approximately 590,000 times, compared to 238,000 in all of FY 2014, the previous peak in Central
American flows.

The interplay of push and pull factors has manifested differently
in each of these three countries, with Guatemalans and
Hondurans dominating migration flows in FY 2018–19.

Although Hondurans represented the largest share of U.S. apprehensions of migrants from these three
Central American countries in FY 2014, Guatemalans overtook them in FY 2015. Notably, apprehensions
of migrants from these three countries have surpassed those of Mexicans every year since FY 2014,
except FY 2015.

20 Ariel G. Ruiz Soto, Rodrigo Dominguez-Villegas, Luis Argueta, and Randy Capps, Sustainable Reintegration: Strategies for
Migrants Returning to Mexico and Central America (Washington, DC: MPI, 2019), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/
sustainable-reintegration-migrants-mexico-central-america.
21 Randy Capps et al., From Control to Crisis: Changing Trends and Policies Reshaping U.S.-Mexico Border Enforcement
(Washington, DC: MPI, 2019), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/changing-trends-policies-reshaping-us-mexico-borderenforcement.
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Figure 9. U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border Apprehensions, by Citizenship, FY 2008–19*
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* Figures for FY 2019 reflect apprehensions occurring from October 2018 through August 2019.
Notes: These data are for U.S. federal government fiscal years, which run from October 1 through September
30. Migrants who are considered inadmissible when they present themselves at U.S. ports of entry without prior
authorization to enter are not included in apprehension totals.
Sources: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), “U.S. Border Patrol Nationwide Apprehensions by
Citizenship and Sector, FY 2007-18,” accessed August 28, 2019, www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/
documents/2019-Mar/BP%20Apps%20by%20Sector%20and%20Citizenship%20FY07-FY18.pdf; CBP, “U.S.
Border Patrol Southwest Border Apprehensions by Sector Fiscal Year 2019,” updated September 9, 2019,
www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration/usbp-sw-border-apprehensions.

The profile of migrants arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border has also changed significantly. Compared to
previous Mexican migration flows, which were predominantly made up of single adult men, Central
American migration is more mixed, with families and unaccompanied children comprising larger shares.
In FY 2013, 4 percent of apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico border were of family units,22 compared
to 56 percent in the first eleven months of FY 2019 (see Figure 10). Except for in FY 2015—the last
time apprehensions of Mexicans were higher than those of Central Americans—the family share of
apprehensions has steadily increased. At the same time, unaccompanied children have remained a
relatively constant share of apprehensions, between 11 and 14 percent through FY 2018.

22 “Family units” is an official term used by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to identify the number of individuals
(either a child under 18 years old, parent, or legal guardian) apprehended with a family member by the U.S. Border
Patrol. For more information, see CBP, “Southwest Border Migration FY 2019,” updated September 9, 2019, www.cbp.gov/
newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration.
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Figure 10. Share of U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border Apprehensions by Category, FY 2013-19*
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These data are for U.S. federal government fiscal years, which run from October 1 through September 30.
Migrants who are considered inadmissible when they present themselves at U.S. ports of entry without prior
authorization to enter are not included in apprehension totals.
Sources: MPI calculations based on number and type of apprehensions by fiscal year using data from U.S.
Border Patrol, “Total Illegal Alien Apprehensions by Month,” accessed August 28, 2019, www.cbp.gov/sites/
default/files/assets/documents/2019-Mar/bp-total-monthly-apps-sector-area-fy2018.pdf; U.S. Border Patrol,
“Total Family Unit Apprehensions by Month,” accessed August 28, 2019, www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/
assets/documents/2019-Mar/bp-total-monthly-family-units-sector-fy13-fy18.pdf; U.S. Border Patrol, “Total
Unaccompanied Alien Children (0-17) Apprehensions by Month,” accessed August 28, 2019, www.cbp.
gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2019-Mar/bp-total-monthly-uacs-sector-fy2010-fy2018.pdf; CBP,
“Southwest Border Migration FY 2019,” updated September 9, 2019, www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-bordermigration.

Renewed migration from Central America has forced the Mexican government to confront its policies
on migration for the first time in many years, including immigration enforcement and its procedures for
asylum and complementary protection. After the arrival of large numbers of Central Americans, including
many unaccompanied children, the Mexican government implemented the Southern Border Program
(Programa Frontera Sur) in 2014 to promote orderly border crossings and facilitate legal temporary
migration from neighboring countries, overall enhancing security and migration management.23

As a result of persistent migration and the program’s implementation, Mexican apprehensions of
migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras rose to 173,000 in FY 2015, surpassing the
134,000 such apprehensions by U.S. immigration authorities that year (see Figure 11). While Mexican
apprehensions of migrants from these countries have since decreased, they remain higher than they were
prior to the implementation of the Southern Border Program. Since April 2019, added migration controls
implemented by Mexico—in response to U.S. pressure and shifts in public opinion in Mexico—have again
dramatically increased apprehensions.24 Overall, Mexico has been responsible for 35 percent of the 2.6
23 Victoria Rietig and Rodrigo Dominguez-Villegas, “Changing Landscape Prompts Mexico’s Emergence as Migration Manager,”
Migration Information Source, December 10, 2014, www.migrationpolicy.org/article/top-10-2014-issue-8-changinglandscape-prompts-mexicos-emergence-migration-manager.
24 Santiago Pérez and Catherine Lucey, “Trump Praises Mexico Amid Record Detention of Migrants,” The Wall Street Journal,
July 1, 2019, www.wsj.com/articles/mexico-detains-record-number-of-migrants-following-deal-with-u-s-11562017847;
Kevin Sieff and Scott Clement, “Unauthorized Immigrants Face Public Backlash in Mexico, Survey Finds,” Washington Post,
July 17, 2019, www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/unauthorized-immigrants-face-public-backlash-in-mexicosurvey-finds/2019/07/16/f7fc5d12-a75e-11e9-a3a6-ab670962db05_story.html.
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million apprehensions of Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans by U.S. and Mexican immigration
authorities from FY 2012 through the first ten months of FY 2019.

Figure 11. U.S. and Mexican Apprehensions of Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran Migrants, FY
2010–19*
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* U.S. and Mexican figures for FY 2019 cover October 2018 through July 2019.
Note: Mexico’s apprehension data are reported by calendar year but have been rearranged to align with the
U.S. fiscal year for comparison purposes. U.S. federal government fiscal years run from October 1 through
September 30.
Sources: MPI calculations using data from CBP, “U.S. Border Patrol Nationwide Apprehensions by Citizenship
and Sector, FY 2007-18”; CBP, “U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border Apprehensions by Sector Fiscal Year
2019”; Mexican Interior Ministry (SEGOB), “Boletín Mensual de Estadísticas Migratorias, 2011–19,” accessed
September 10, 2019, http://portales.segob.gob.mx/es/PoliticaMigratoria/Boletines_Estadisticos.

Although the United States apprehends Central American migrants at a higher rate than Mexico, Mexico
has carried out more removals of these migrants at the Mexico-Guatemala border and in the interior
since FY 2015 (see Figure 12). Combined removals from both countries reached nearly 241,000 in FY
2015, the year in which removals from Mexico overtook those from the United States, before falling to
approximately 195,000 in FY 2018. Over the seven-year period between FY 2012 and FY 2018, Mexico
was responsible for 54 percent of the 1.4 million total removals of migrants to El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras by U.S. and Mexican authorities.
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Figure 12. Removals from the United States and Mexico to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, FY
2012–18*
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* Pending the publication of consolidated removal data by DHS for FY 2018, MPI has approximated U.S.
removals for that period based on data provided by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which
include a small number of returns made by ICE and do not include a small number of removals by CBP. Figures
for FY 2012 through FY 2018 do not include U.S. “returns” which are considered voluntary requests by migrants
to be returned, as opposed to removals which are compulsory orders by U.S. immigration authorities.
Note: Mexico’s removal data are reported by calendar year but have been rearranged to align with the
U.S. fiscal year for comparison purposes. U.S. federal government fiscal years run from October 1 through
September 30.
Sources: MPI calculations using data from DHS, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2017”; ICE, Fiscal Year
2018 ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Report (Washington, DC: ICE, 2018), www.ice.gov/doclib/
about/offices/ero/pdf/eroFY2018Report.pdf. SEGOB, “Boletín Mensual de Estadísticas Migratorias, 2011–19.”

Both Mexico and the United States have also seen significant increases in requests for asylum by Central
Americans. Compounding the effects of ongoing regional violence and insecurity, emerging push factors
such as severe drought and political instability have exacerbated emigration pressures and contributed to
dramatic increases in asylum requests in the absence of other legal migration mechanisms.25 In FY 2018,
U.S. immigration authorities conducted nearly 63,000 credible-fear interviews with migrants from El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—a key proxy of intentions to seek asylum—representing a 21 percent
increase compared to FY 2017. Approximately 30,000 migrants from these countries had a credible-fear
interview in the first six months of FY 2019, compared to 28,000 in the same period of FY 2018.26 Given
the recording-setting number of apprehensions in the summer months of 2019, it is likely that crediblefear interviews and, consequently, asylum applications in FY 2019 will surpass previous levels.
Meanwhile, asylum claims by Central American migrants in Mexico have ballooned in recent years.
Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans filed approximately 1,000 asylum claims in calendar year
2013, rising to more than 21,000 in 2018 (see Figure 13). And in the first eight months of 2019, Mexican
authorities received approximately 32,000 asylum requests from nationals of these three countries—

25 For a detailed description of changes in push and pull factors leading to increases in asylum petitions in the United States
and Mexico, see Capps et al., From Control to Crisis.
26 MPI calculations based on data from USCIS, “Monthly Credible Fear Top Five Nationalities Received, Fiscal Year 2019,”
accessed August 29, 2019, www.uscis.gov/outreach/asylum-division-quarterly-stakeholder-meeting-10; USCIS, “Monthly
Credible Fear Top Five Nationalities Received, Fiscal Year 2018,” accessed August 29, 2019, www.uscis.gov/outreach/asylumdivision-quarterly-stakeholder-meeting-9; USCIS “Monthly Credible Fear Top Five Nationalities Received, Fiscal Year 2017,”
accessed August 29, 2019, www.uscis.gov/outreach/asylum-division-quarterly-stakeholder-meeting-8.
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already surpassing the total number for all countries in 2018; officials project 80,000 total petitions will
be filed by the end of the year.27

Figure 13. Asylum Claims Submitted to the Mexican Refugee Commission by Salvadoran, Guatemalan,
and Honduran Migrants, 2013–19*
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* Asylum claims in Mexico are reported by calendar year. Figures for 2019 are year to date figures that reflect
asylum claims made from January 2019 through August 2019.
Sources: Mexican Refugee Commission (COMAR), “Estadísticas 2013 - 2017,” accessed April 11, 2019,
www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/290340/ESTADISTICAS_2013_A_4TO_TRIMESTRE_2017.pdf;
COMAR, “Reporte Cierre de Agosto 2019,” updated September 4, 2019, www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/
file/490723/REPORTE_CIERRE_DE_AGOSTO2019.pdf.

The asylum systems of both Mexico and the United States have been unable to keep up with the growing
number of requests. Cases are not resolved for long periods of time—years in the United States and
months in Mexico—producing neither relief for those in need of protection nor deterrence of illegitimate
claims. As of June 2019, approximately 350,000 asylum cases waited unresolved in U.S. immigration
courts.28 In Mexico, 80 percent of all asylum cases submitted to the Mexican Refugee Commission
(Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados, or COMAR) in 2018 remained unresolved at the year’s end.29

Grant rates for Central Americans’ asylum claims in U.S. immigration courts decreased moderately in FY
2018 compared to FY 2016.30 The decrease was most significant for Guatemalans, falling from a grant rate
of 31 percent in FY 2016 to 18 percent in FY 2018. The grant rates decreased less for Salvadorans (from
25 in FY 2016 to 23 percent in FY 2018) and for Hondurans (from 25 to 20 percent).
27 SEGOB, “Estadísticas de la Coordinación General de la Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados,” accessed August 28, 2019,
www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/474982/INFORME_PRESIDENCIA.pdf.
28 Testimony of Kevin McAleenan, Acting Homeland Security Secretary, before the Senate Judiciary Committee, The Secure and
Protect Act: A Legislative Fix to the Crisis at the Southwest Border, 116th Cong., 1st sess., June 11, 2019, www.judiciary.senate.
gov/meetings/the-secure-and-protect-act-a-legislative-fix-to-the-crisis-at-the-southwest-border.
29 Mexican Refugee Commission (COMAR), “Reporte General de Solicitudes (Casos y Personas) al 31 de Diciembre y Registro
de Resoluciones a Diciembre 2018,” accessed April 11, 2019, www.scribd.com/document/397230462/Reporte-Comar-aDiciembre-2018.
30 MPI calculations based on data from the U.S. Department of Justice, “Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication
Statistics,” updated October 24, 2018, www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1107366/download; Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse (TRAC), “Asylum Decisions by Custody, Representation, Nationality, Location, Month and Year, Outcome and
More,” accessed August 29, 2019, https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/asylum/. MPI calculates asylum grant rates by
dividing granted cases by the sum of granted and denied cases. Cases that were abandoned or withdrawn are not considered
in the calculation of grant rates given that they were not resolved.
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In addition to asylum, the Mexican government also grants complementary protection to migrants
who do not qualify for asylum but would be at risk of harm if returned to their countries of origin, and
Mexican asylum law generally takes a broader interpretation of the reasons for granting asylum and
complementary protection.31 The share of applicants for protection who received either asylum or
complementary protection was 81 percent among those whose cases were completed from January
through September 2018 (and 71 percent among asylum seekers from El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras).32 Because large shares of asylum cases are still pending or have been abandoned or
withdrawn, however, these recognition rates do not paint a complete picture of the extent to which
migrants seeking humanitarian protection in Mexico receive it.

These heightened pressures on the asylum systems of both Mexico and the United States have challenged
their abilities to adjudicate petitions fairly and efficiently, and raised concerns about how this is affecting
vulnerable groups.33 Of special concern is the limited capacity of the Mexican asylum system to protect
minors in accordance with the law, and the U.S. system’s failures to adapt to the specific needs of families
and children traveling alone.

These heightened pressures on the asylum systems of both
Mexico and the United States have challenged their abilities to
adjudicate petitions fairly and efficiently.

D.

Other Migrants at the U.S.-Mexico Border

Other migrants constitute a small, but growing part of the flow at the U.S.-Mexico border. From FY 2014 to
FY 2018, migrants from countries other than Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras represented
between 3 and 5 percent of U.S. apprehensions, but approximately 9 percent in the first eleven months
of FY 2019.34 The composition of these flows has changed year to year, but most recently, the top
nationalities have been India, Brazil, Ecuador, China, and Nicaragua (see Figure 14).

31 As a signatory of the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Mexico considers generalized violence and internal conflicts,
among other criteria, when considering these cases. See Mexican Foreign Ministry (SRE), “Lineaminetos para Atender
Solicitudes de Asilo y Refugio,” updated July 2016, https://extranet.sre.gob.mx/images/stories/asilo/asilo2016.pdf; Ley
Sobre Refugiados, Protección Complementaria y Asilo Político, enacted January 27, 2011 and reformed October 30, 2014,
www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/211049/08_Ley_sobre_Refugiados__Protecci_n_Complementaria_y_Asilo_Pol_
tico.pdf.
32 COMAR, Boletín Estadístico de Solicitantes de Refugio en México 2018 (Mexico City: SEGOB, 2018), www.gob.mx/cms/
uploads/attachment/file/427549/COMAR2018.pdf.
33 On Mexico, see Rodrigo Dominguez-Villegas, Strengthening Mexico’s Protection of Central America Unaccompanied Minors
in Transit (Washington, DC: MPI, 2017), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/strengthening-mexicos-protection-centralamerican-unaccompanied-minors-transit. On the United States, see Doris Meissner, Faye Hipsman, and T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, The U.S. Asylum System in Crisis: Charting a Way Forward (Washington, DC: MPI, 2018), www.migrationpolicy.org/
research/us-asylum-system-crisis-charting-way-forward.
34 MPI calculations based on data from CBP, “U.S. Border Patrol Nationwide Apprehensions by Citizenship and Sector, FY 200718,” accessed August 28, 2019, www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2019-Mar/BP%20Apps%20by%20
Sector%20and%20Citizenship%20FY07-FY18.pdf; CBP, “U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border Apprehensions by Sector
Fiscal Year 2019,” updated September 9, 2019, www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration/usbp-sw-borderapprehensions.
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Figure 14. U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border Apprehensions of Migrants Not from Mexico, El
Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras, by Citizenship, FY 2014–18
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Note: These data are for U.S. federal government fiscal years, which run from October 1 through September
30.
Source: MPI calculations based on data from CBP, “U.S. Border Patrol Nationwide Apprehensions by
Citizenship and Sector, FY 2007-18.”

Unauthorized migrants from outside the hemisphere are the subject of considerable attention from
U.S. and Mexican authorities. This is largely because of concerns about the potential, no matter how
slight, of terrorist infiltration, and the complex criminal smuggling networks that often lie behind these
movements, but also because of their growing weight in the overall flow. The U.S. Acting Secretary of
Homeland Security has made several visits to Central American countries to discuss this issue, and the
Mexican government has also begun making it harder for migrants from other countries to obtain transit
documents.35

Of particular note is the number of Venezuelans arriving in
Mexico on work visas or to seek asylum due to political conflict
and the almost complete collapse of the Venezuelan economy.

From within the Americas, Mexico has seen migration from Cuba, Haiti, and Venezuela evolve in recent
years. Of particular note is the number of Venezuelans arriving in Mexico on work visas or to seek asylum
due to political conflict and the almost complete collapse of the Venezuelan economy. Though roughly
35 Elida Moreno, “U.S. Urges Colombia and Central America to Help Stem Migration,” Reuters, August 22, 2019, https://
af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKCN1VC2FO; Alberto Pradilla, “Migrantes Africanos Varados en Tapachula,
Chiapas, Acusan Que No Les Dan Soluciones para Ir Hacia EU,” Animal Político, September 4, 2019, www.animalpolitico.
com/2019/09/migrantes-africanos-varados-chiapas-trayecto-eu/.
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80 percent of Venezuelan emigrants have fled to other Latin American countries, the United Nations
estimates that there are more than 46,000 in Mexico, most having arrived since 2015.36

Similarly, the number of Venezuelans in the United States has increased rapidly from 256,000 in 2015
to 351,000 in 2017.37 But so far there is little evidence of Venezuelans trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico
border illegally; in FY 2018, there were only 62 apprehensions of Venezuelans at the U.S.-Mexico border.38
However, this remains a trend worth watching.

III.

Changing Policy Options

The mental maps of policymakers and the public on both sides of the Mexico-U.S. border continue to be
dominated by the specter of large-scale, irregular migration from Mexico to the United States. Yet, the
situation on the ground has changed. Both countries are contending with rising mixed migration flows of
humanitarian and economic migrants from Central America. Most are trying to reach the United States,
but some stay in Mexico. Meanwhile, both Mexico and the United States host large numbers of each
other’s nationals. This changing migration landscape demands a critical rethink of long-held assumptions
and should create new opportunities for cooperation.

A.

Structural Convergence with Political Divergence

Mexico and the United States face increasingly parallel migration challenges. Both receive migrants and
asylum seekers in large numbers, and both have each other’s nationals as the leading immigrant group.
Moreover, both are dealing with some of the same political stresses and strains and face important policy
choices about how immigrants come into the country and how they are integrated into society.

At the same time, crucial differences remain. While Mexico has a large U.S.-born population, many of them
have Mexican heritage and are less immediately visible in Mexican society. Meanwhile, Mexico remains
more a country of transit than a receiving country for unauthorized migrants and asylum seekers from
Central America and elsewhere in the hemisphere, although this may be changing gradually. Mexico also
has a much larger diaspora in the United States than vice versa, and many of the Mexicans living north of
the border are without legal status, putting them in a far more precarious situation than most Americans
in Mexico.
So, although Mexico and the United States do not find themselves on completely parallel tracks, they are
far closer than at any of time in recent history, and far more so than most observers in either country
realize. Nationalist politics obscure some of these growing similarities. In particular, the U.S. political
discussion often does little to differentiate between Mexican and Central American irregular flows, and
the current administration has often preferred unilateral measures, such as tariff threats, a border wall,
and metering,39 to address what could and should be common challenges with shared solutions. At the
same time, Mexico has yet to come to terms fully with the fact that the country is becoming a migrantreceiving society, with all the possibilities and challenges that this entails. This lack of awareness in
Mexico plays out in a failure to fully address the challenges of irregular migration and the increasing
demands on the asylum system—major policy issues that require long-term solutions—or the integration
needs of the growing foreign-born population.
36 Estimates by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration
(IOM), based on Mexican government data, see UNHCR and IOM, “Plataforma de Coordinación para Refugiados y Migrantes
Venezolanos,” updated August 5, 2019, https://r4v.info/es/situations/platform.
37 MPI calculations based on U.S. Census Bureau data from the 2015 and 2017 American Community Surveys (ACS).
38 CBP, “U.S. Border Patrol Nationwide Apprehensions by Citizenship and Sector, FY 2007-18.”
39 Capps et al., From Control to Crisis.
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As time goes on, and the challenges they wrestle with become increasingly similar, Mexico and the United
States will each need to find ways to deal with these issues internally and with each other if they have any
hope of managing shared migration flows effectively. Indeed, there is no way to address flows between
the two countries without adopting a regional approach. This section offers policy options that may help
U.S. and Mexican policymakers rethink these issues, to the benefit of both countries.

B.

Options for Creating and Expanding Legal Pathways

Cracking down on unwanted migration is one way to address these mixed flows, but experience
demonstrates that no amount of enforcement will succeed in lowering the numbers if not accompanied
by efforts to fix chronically backlogged asylum systems and provide some labor-based legal pathways as
alternatives to irregular movement.
1.

Fixing Asylum Systems

Many migrants fleeing El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (and increasingly Nicaragua and Venezuela)
are doing so to seek protection from persecution or generalized violence. Timely decisions about asylum
are both far more fair to those who have valid protection claims and the best deterrent against misuse by
those who would file claims that have little chance of succeeding in order to remain in the country while
their cases sit in a growing backlog.

Timely decisions about asylum are both far more fair to those
who have valid protection claims and the best deterrent
against misuse.

Asylum protections should be broad, but decisions need to be made efficiently. In the case of Mexico, this
means a significant increase in the personnel and capacity of COMAR so that it can process decisions
within 45 business days, as its mandate requires. COMAR will need to increase its budget by three to four
times to meet this mandate, but given the small size of its current budget—roughly 1.2 million dollars—
this is a relatively minimal investment for a large return in terms of policy effectiveness, fairness, and
deterrence.40 Mexican authorities may also want to consider granting asylum applicants greater flexibility
to move within the country, rather than requiring them to remain in the zone where they first applied
for asylum; this could ease pressure on communities and service providers in areas of the country where
large numbers of claims are filed, and enable asylum seekers to move to areas that are safer and have
better labor market prospects, facilitating their self-sufficiency.

While the Mexican government will have to lead these changes, the U.S. government could provide much
needed support either directly or through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, as doing so could have
significant advantages in terms of taking pressure off the U.S. asylum system.
Meanwhile, the United States needs to make its own asylum processes timelier and far more efficient.41
One way to do this is to allow asylum officers to make the first decision on claims, rather than sending all
cases to the overburdened immigration courts. This would vastly speed up asylum processing, allowing
40 Lizbeth Diaz and Delphine Schrank, “Mexico’s Refugee Agency Turns to U.N. Amid Asylum Surge, Funding Cuts,” Reuters,
May 21, 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-mexico/mexicos-tiny-refugee-agency-turns-to-un-amidasylum-surge-funding-cuts-idUSKCN1SS06N. For additional detail on previous annual budgets for COMAR, see Fundar,
Analisis del Paquete Economico 2019 (Mexico City: Fundar, 2019), 11, http://fundar.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/
Ana%CC%81lisis-del-Paquete-Econo%CC%81mico-2019.pdf.
41 For an in-depth discussion of these issues in the U.S. context and recommended improvements, see Meissner, Hipsman, and
Aleinikoff, The U.S. Asylum System in Crisis.
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decisions to be taken within a few months instead of a few years. This change would both provide relief
more quickly to those in need and erase perverse incentives to file unfounded claim.

This change would need to be accompanied by an important investment in asylum officers and perhaps
immigration judges to handle appeals. The U.S. government should also consider returning to the broader
definition of asylum that existed prior to 2018, which was based on years of jurisprudence that had
expanded the grounds of asylum to deal with the challenges of gang persecution and domestic violence
in circumstances where the state is incapable or unwilling to protect its own citizens. Fairness and
deterrence are not at odds with each other; in fact, they are complementary.
For asylum seekers awaiting decisions on their applications, U.S. authorities should consider the merits
of a robust case management system.42 Such a system promises to ensure they appear on their appointed
hearing dates and understand immigration court proceedings. It would also be far less expensive and
psychologically damaging than long-term detention. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
has experimented with this type of supervision in the past, including most notably with the Family Case
Management Program for Central American families, which achieved a 99 percent compliance rate.43
Because past programs have generally been limited in scale, research should be conducted to make sure
that this approach is effective when applied broadly.

DHS might also consider rethinking the design of its border installations, which were designed for a
different era when the flow was primarily of Mexican men. Creating physical infrastructure that can
collocate U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), ICE, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) asylum officers, possibly immigration judges, and nongovernmental organizations serving
migrants and asylum seekers could benefit all parties involved and make possible a more coordinated and
coherent response.
Mexico and the United States might also look at alternate ways of conducting in-country or off-shore
processing for Central American asylum seekers. These could include safe zones within Central America
where asylum applications could be filed, as was tried in a limited way with the Central American Minors
(CAM) program (which included an alternate safe zone in Costa Rica, for those who needed to leave their
origin country completely).44 Alternately or additionally, the U.S. and Mexican governments—possibly
together with other partner governments—could establish a joint asylum processing center in southern
Mexico to receive asylum applications in a safe zone.
All of these options are far more likely to strengthen the response to humanitarian movements through
the region than current attempts to outsource asylum processes to third countries that do not have the
capacity to handle a high volume of claims or to force asylum seekers to wait in precarious conditions
along Mexico’s northern border. Indeed, U.S. policymakers appear to be pursuing some of the least
effective, sustainable, and fair options available, rather than those with a high probability of success.
Mexican policymakers have agreed to some of these measures, though perhaps less than enthusiastically,
without providing a clear alternative path.
2.

Creating Pathways for Labor Migration

While a substantial number of irregular migrants from Central America are seeking protection, others
are looking to improve their lives by pursuing employment opportunities they cannot find in their home
countries; many move for a combination of these and other reasons, such as family reunification. Though
recently declining, high birth rates in Guatemala and persistent drought in Guatemala and Honduras have
42 Capps et al., From Control to Crisis, 35–36.
43 This program was operated by GeoCare, a unit of an ICE detention contractor, and subcontractors. GeoCare, Family Case
Management Program: September 21, 2015-June 20, 2017 (unpublished summary report, undated). For a discussion of the
program, see also Capps et al., From Control to Crisis, 36.
44 Faye Hipsman and Doris Meissner, In-Country Refugee Processing in Central America: A Piece of the Puzzle (Washington, DC:
MPI, 2015), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/country-processing-central-america-piece-puzzle.
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accentuated a pattern of irregular labor migration that started in earnest in 2012 and has since risen
significantly.45 Gang activity and disputes, as well as crime syndicates, also appear to be on the rise and
prey on local populations in the region, at times in collusion with public authorities.46

It will never be possible (or politically feasible) for the United States and Mexico to offer employment
to all Central Americans who want it. Yet, targeted employment-based visa programs could well help fill
labor shortages in both countries, while also discouraging irregular migration by providing alternatives to
some of those who might otherwise seek to cross borders illegally.

The new president of Mexico has expressed the desire to create a work-based temporary visa for Central
Americans.47 This can be done in part by extending the existing Border Worker Visitor Card, which
currently applies to citizens of Guatemala and Belize, to Salvadorans and Hondurans. Policymakers could
also expand the number of states in southern Mexico where card holders can work in order to reinforce
the existing regional labor market between southern Mexico and neighboring Central American countries.

Targeted employment-based visa programs could well help
fill labor shortages in both countries, while also discouraging
irregular migration by providing alternatives.
However, Mexico’s major labor shortages lie further away in the center and north of the country,
particularly in the areas dominated by industrial production and export-oriented agriculture. Mexico
has neither an effective employment-based visa for lower-skilled workers nor a mechanism for matching
potential employees from Central America with employers in the Mexican formal economy. An effort to
remedy this situation should be targeted not only toward Central American job-seekers but also jobseekers from southern Mexico as such a strategy could be a win-win for both Mexicans from some of the
country’s poorest states and Central Americans who wish to migrate to Mexico (and who, having secured
a legal job in Mexico, might forego trying to enter the United States).
Designing a program of this nature requires significant expertise and planning. This could prove an area
ripe for cooperation between the U.S. and Mexican governments, as well as businesses, civic groups,
and international organizations. The Mexican-Canadian Agreement on temporary guest workers might
provide a template for the development of programs with Central American countries, which would then
requires bringing their governments into the design process.48
The United States currently has limited options for labor migration for Central Americans, particularly
the lower skilled. The H-2B program, which admits seasonal nonagricultural workers ranging from
landscapers to crab pickers, is capped, and the uncapped H-2A program for agricultural workers has

45 Population Reference Bureau, “2018 World Population Data Sheet,” accessed September 12, 2019, www.prb.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/2018_WPDS.pdf; Oxfam, “‘Mojados’ por la Sequía: Hambre y migración en el Corredor Seco de
Guatemala,” updated April 23, 2019, https://reliefweb.int/report/guatemala/mojados-por-la-sequ-hambre-y-migraci-n-enel-corredor-seco-de-guatemala.
46 Ben Raderstorf, Carole J. Wilson, Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, and Michael J. Camilleri, Beneath the Violence: How Insecurity
Shapes Daily Life and Emigration in Central America (Washington, DC: The Inter-American Dialogue, 2017), www.thedialogue.
org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Crime-Avoidance-Report-FINAL-ONLINE.pdf.
47 Alberto Morales and Misael Zavala, “México Detendrá Flujo de Migrantes con Visas de Trabajo dice López Obrador,” El
Universal, March 28, 2019, www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/mexico-detendra-flujo-de-migrantes-con-visas-de-trabajo-dicelopez-obrador.
48 Ian Van Haren and Claudia Masferrer, “Mexican Migration to Canada: Temporary Worker Programs, Visa Imposition, and
NAFTA Shape Flows,” Migration Information Source, March 20, 2019, www.migrationpolicy.org/article/mexican-migrationcanada.
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historically favored Mexicans over Central Americans.49 Since these programs are employer driven, there
is no straightforward way to shift this preference and encourage employers to develop recruitment
networks in Central America. However, one option worthy of further discussion is opening recruitment
centers in the Central American countries to connect employers and prospective workers, as has been
discussed between the U.S. and Guatemalan governments.50

If the U.S. Congress decides to debate a reform of the legal immigration system, this would be an
opportunity to create more targeted employment-based programs that could offer new migration options
for Central Americans. Over time, U.S. immigration policy should open avenues for hiring workers from
across the skill spectrum to fill jobs in industries and occupations where labor markets are very tight51—a
move that would benefit both U.S. employers struggling to find workers and, very likely, low- and middleskilled Central Americas seeking to come to the United States. In any U.S. immigration reform, it will be
critical to think specifically about regional migration as a distinct arena that deserves special attention.52

C.

Options for Investing in Modern Enforcement and Border Management

All countries should control their borders and know who enters their territory, but simultaneously
encourage and facilitate legal transit and commerce. However, current U.S.-Mexico border policies
do not reflect the changed reality of migration between the two countries. Many are rooted in policy
decisions made two or more decades ago, when irregular migration from Mexico was still in full swing
and legal flows of people and goods were much lower. Today, the two economies and societies are deeply
intertwined and the number of legal crossings each day have multiplied, while illegal entries by Mexican
migrants have dropped to much lower levels. The challenge today is dealing with irregular flows of
migrants from third countries, principally (but not exclusively) in Central America, while ensuring robust
and fluid legal commerce and exchange.
1.

Immigration Enforcement

Perhaps the most important change that the U.S. and Mexican governments could make to manage
irregular flows is to fix their asylum systems, as discussed above. But there are also sound investments in
modern enforcement strategies that could help the countries both deal with the current surge in Central
American migration and plan for the long term.
In the case of Mexico, it will be critical to make significant investments in modernizing the National
Migration Institute (Instituto Nacional de Migración, or INM). This would need to include updating
procedures and policies, creating a career path for INM agents and staff with significant salary increases,
and developing internal control mechanisms that ensure compliance with legal norms. INM will need
to define more clearly both its service and law enforcement components and its relationships with the
National Guard and Customs Service (Servicio de Administración Tributaria, or SAT).53 Mexican officials

49 In FY 2018, for example, more than 180,000 H-2A visas were issued to Mexican nationals, compared to about 4,000 to Guatemalans, 300 to Hondurans, and nearly 150 to Salvadorans. See U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Nonimmigrant Visa Issuances by Visa Class and by Nationality, FY1997-2018.”
50 DHS, “Joint Statement between the U.S. Government and the Government of Guatemala,” updated July 24, 2019, www.dhs.
gov/news/2019/07/22/joint-statement-between-us-government-and-government-guatemala.
51 Pia M. Orrenius, Madeline Zavodny, and Stephanie Gullo, How Does Immigration Fit into the Future of the U.S. Labor Market?
(Washington, DC: MPI, 2019), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-fit-future-us-labor-market.
52 Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Doris Meissner, and Eleanor Sohnen, Thinking Regionally to Compete Globally: Leveraging
Migration in the U.S., Mexico, and Central America (Washington, DC: MPI, 2013), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/thinkingregionally-compete-globally-leveraging-migration-human-capital-us-mexico-and.
53 For previous recommendations on institutional change at Mexico’s National Migration Institute (INM), see Instituto para la
Seguridad y la Democracia (INSYDE), Diagnostico del Instituto Nacional de Migración (Mexico City: INSYDE, 2013), http://
insyde.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Resumen_Ejecutivo_Diagn%C3%B3stico_INM-Insyde-Espa%C3%B1ol.pdf;
Consejo Cuidadano del Instituto Nacional de Migración (CCINM), Personas en Detención Migratoria en México (Mexico City:
CCINM, 2017), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CESCR/Shared%20Documents/MEX/INT_CESCR_CSS_MEX_28755_S.
pdf.
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may even want to consider whether INM should be replaced by a different institution that covers a
broader mandate around border management.

It would be particularly important for INM (or a successor agency) to digitize its application procedures
and records to better serve applicants and limit opportunities for corruption. The Mexican government
will also need to invest in detention centers that meet international standards, especially with regards
to minors and other vulnerable populations.54 The United States could help the Mexican government
address the structural needs of its migration agency through information sharing, technology transfer,
and funding, either directly or in partnership with the International Organization for Migration. This
would be a wise investment for both countries.

All of this should be eminently doable since INM raises significant revenue for the Mexican government
through the fees charged to tourists and business travelers. A small increase in fees could easily cover
additional expenditures to modernize the agency without taking funds from other areas of government.55
The U.S. government also needs to rethink its approach to migrant detention. As noted above in the
discussion of strategies for fixing the U.S. asylum system, there are alternatives to detention that would
be both humane and fundamentally more well suited to the rapidly changing profile of arriving migrants.
This revised approach could also include collocating different U.S. agencies and nongovernmental service
providers within detention facilitates to ensure coordination and attention to migrants’ needs, and
creating career paths for CBP staff who are not agents but case workers.
Both countries should commit to treating child migrants with utmost care in accordance with the highest
standards of international law and to avoiding the separation of families, except in the most extenuating
of circumstances.
2.

Shared Border Management

The two governments should also continue their efforts to modernize their shared border. Efforts to
place pre-inspection officers inside each country, to expand trusted traveler and shipper programs, and
to expand unified cargo processing help facilitate legitimate transit while making it easier to detect illicit
flows. These efforts, led by SAT and CBP, focus on ensuring greater security and scrutiny within existing
flows rather than solely trying to stop illicit traffic at the border. They also take advantage of information
and intelligence sharing as central elements in identifying potential threats. While mostly focused on
commerce, rather than the flow of people, there are enormous opportunities to take a similar approach to
the transit of individuals (as has happened with trusted traveler programs already).
Together, the U.S. and Mexican governments are advancing towards building a 21st-century border that
enhances both security and transit, but there is a risk of backsliding as the focus on illegal crossings
dominates all other issues. Significant investments in non-intrusive inspection technology are necessary
to help agents on both sides of the border better identify illegal shipments hidden within ongoing border
flows, including illegal narcotics, firearms, and bulk cash.56
Between ports of entry, it will be vital to build a relationship between Mexico’s newly formed National
Guard and the U.S. Border Patrol. This would facilitate the sharing of information and intelligence in real
time and could build on the relationship that was previously developed between the Federal Police and
the Border Patrol. Additional expenditures in technology between ports of entry could help facilitate

54 Rebekah F. Ward, “Mexico Detains Migrant Children in Cramped Holding Centers Despite Court Ruling,” Reuters, August 9,
2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-mexico/mexico-detains-migrant-children-in-cramped-holding-centerdespite-court-ruling-idUSKCN1UZ2C2.
55 Rodolfo Córdova Alcaraz, Una Mirada al Presupuesto del Instituto Nacional de Migración en México (Mexico City: Fundar,
2013), www.fundar.org.mx/mexico/pdf/INM2011.pdf; Fundar, Analisis del Paquete Economico 2019.
56 On the history of creating a more efficient and secure border, see Andrew Selee, Vanishing Frontiers: The Forces Driving
Mexico and the United States Together (New York City: PublicAffairs, 2018), 66–72.
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the detection of illicit transit, although these are unlikely to be successful in the overall goal of migration
management without reforms to the U.S. asylum system.

Finally, the United States and Mexico should begin to look more strategically at how they identify and
track the smuggling networks that move large numbers of people to and across the shared border. There
is still relatively little systematic intelligence on these networks that would help identify their leadership,
structure, and resources. With improved information, the governments could consider how best to target
the structure and finances of these groups, starting with those that move third-country nationals from
outside the hemisphere and those that engage in predatory behavior towards migrants.

D.

Options for Immigrant Integration and Inclusion

The greatest proof of successful immigration policy is if immigrants and their children have equal
opportunities to fully participate in the economy and the social fabric of their communities. Perhaps no
area of cooperation is more important or has the greatest unexplored potential than sharing ideas and
practices across the border on how to best integrate immigrants into society.
1.

Investing in Education and Access to Services

The United States has long-standing efforts to integrate newcomers and their children into its
school systems, workforce, and other areas of public life. But these programs and services are often
underfunded and need to be improved to meet the challenges of the future as migration flows become
more diverse in their national origins and the labor market becomes more technology focused. These
efforts should include a focus on improving the quality of English Learner (EL) services in schools, as
well as investments for adults in workforce programs that promote integration outcomes. And given the
rising levels of education among Mexican and other recent immigrants to the United States, credential
recognition policies could benefit both newcomers and the communities in which they settle.

The Mexican government has also contributed significant resources to support the integration of Mexican
migrants into U.S. society through its consular programming and public-private partnerships focusing
on health, education, labor rights, and financial literacy.57 Collaboration between the two countries in
this regard already exists and can be expanded in ways that recognize not just structural barriers to
integration but also cultural and linguistic factors that can support integration across generations.

In Mexico, there has been little attention to date to the integration of the more than 600,000 children who
were born in the United States and now reside in Mexico.58 U.S. consulates in the country play a key role
in providing important identity and other documents to U.S. citizens, but there are gaps when it comes to
this young and growing population. More attention should also be paid to the integration of the hundreds
of thousands of return migrants who are Mexican citizens but have lived much of their lives abroad—not
to mention immigrants from Central America, Cuba, Haiti, and elsewhere. Sustained efforts to provide
access to identification documents and to adapt education systems, health programs, public services, and
job training to meet their needs is essential for their future success and the broader Mexican society. For
example, ensuring that public universities accept students who have attended high school abroad remains
a challenge in some states, as does credential recognition of professional degrees across different fields.59
The Mexican government, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations could also help
recent arrivals (both the U.S. born and Mexicans who have lived in the United States for an extended

57 Alexandra Délano Alonso, From Here and There: Diasora Policies, Integration, and Social Rights beyond Borders (New York
City: Oxford University Press, 2018). Consular services and programming vary by site but generally include workstations on
educational access, basic health screenings and referrals, financial literacy, among others. For example, see Mexican Consulate in New York, “Programas,” accessed August 11, 2019, https://consulmex.sre.gob.mx/nuevayork/index.php/espanol/
programas.
58 U.S. Embassy in Mexico, “Niños Migrantes son Prioridad para Consulado.”
59 Ruiz Soto, Dominguez-Villegas, Argueta, and Capps, Sustainable Reintegration.
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time) by facilitating Spanish language training and orientation programs. Mexico already offers this
kind of support with English language access for its nationals in the United States, and this could act
as a template for future domestic efforts. Existing federal and state programs for Mexican returning
migrants could also be expanded—for example, those that assist participants in navigating government
institutions, opening a bank account, or starting a business.

To strengthen its integration services for Mexicans returning voluntarily and involuntarily, as well as U.S.born immigrants, it is essential for Mexico to develop an institutional framework for collaboration across
government institutions at the federal, state, and local level, and with other stakeholders such as the U.S.
consular network. Integration efforts on both sides of the Mexico-U.S. border also stand to benefit from
closer cooperation between the two countries as they have much to learn from each other. In the realm of
education, teacher and administrator exchanges, textbook programs, and teaching guides could support
the outcomes of immigrant students. There are huge opportunities to promote this kind of exchange
through public-private partnerships as well as expanded support for civil-society organizations and
educational and health institutions as they develop such programs.

Mexico already offers this kind of support with English
language access for its nationals in the United States, and this
could act as a template for future domestic efforts.
2.

Social Cohesion

Beyond the focus on access to services and institutional capacity, both countries face the larger and less
tangible challenge of strengthening social cohesion—how immigrant and native-born residents forge
a common understanding of what it means to belong to the same community. While social cohesion, to
some extent, has to develop organically within communities, principled leadership from policymakers can
plays an important role in defining an inclusive society. These common understandings about what binds
people—newcomers and natives—together have become frayed in recent years in the United States, and
they have yet to be built in Mexico, which is still coming to terms with its role as an immigrant-receiving
society.
In Mexico, large-scale return migration from the United States adds an additional layer of complexity
to these dynamics. There is considerable stigma in the country around return migration, which is often
conflated with criminal behavior. There is an urgent need to change the language used to describe
returnees in public discourse and to acknowledge their potential and real contributions to the labor
market and society at large. Indeed, studies increasingly show that returning migrants may bring both
tangible and intangible skills, such as entrepreneurship, that can contribute to their post-return success.60

Finally, in both Mexico and the United States, it is crucial to invest not just in immigrants and returning
migrants but in receiving communities as well. Investments in education, health care, and housing in the
localities where migrants settle can help bring up the quality of life for all, rather than creating a zero-sum
situation between recent arrivals and long-time residents.

60 Jacqueline Hagan, Ruben Hernandez-Leon, and Jean-Luc Demonsant, Skills of the Unskilled: Work and Mobility Among Mexican Migrants (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2015).
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3.

Legal Status

Lacking legal status in any country creates barriers to positive educational and labor outcomes,
particularly for unauthorized immigrant children and youth. In the United States, addressing the
precarious position of the Dreamers—both current DACA recipients and others who came to the
United States as children without legal status but are not eligible for DACA—would not only support
their integration and socioeconomic wellbeing, but also enable them to contribute more fully to the
communities in which they live.

Almost half of Mexican-born immigrants in the United States lack legal status,61 so any future immigration
reform that addresses this issue by creating an earned legalization program would have a huge impact
on Mexican immigrants. This, in turn, would strengthen the integration of this sizeable population and
provide a boost to U.S. labor markets.
Mexico, as it transitions into an immigrant-receiving country, must also consider effective legal
pathways for unauthorized immigrants already in the country to adjust their status, as well as additional
mechanisms for future legal migration. While asylum has become the primary vehicle for migrants
seeking to adjust their status in Mexico, the system is overwhelmed and ill equipped to process high
volumes of petitions, resulting in long delays that limit asylum seekers’ access to critical integration
services. Previous government efforts to regularize immigrants’ status offer a promising starting point,
if combined with increased outreach and timely adjudication.62 Even if small shares of migrants consider
staying permanently in Mexico, providing legal pathways for them can maximize their social integration
and economic contributions in the country over the long term.

E.

Options for Investing in Regional Development and Addressing the Root Cause of
Migration

The Mexican, U.S., and Central American governments have long utilized strategic development assistance
as a long-term strategy for addressing the root causes of irregular migration through the region. The
governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras established the Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity
in 2014 to stimulate the productive sector, develop human capital, improve public safety, and strengthen
government institutions.63 In a separate but complementary effort, the United States seeks to promote
economic prosperity, improve security, and strengthen governance in the region through its Strategy for
Engagement in Central America.64 In June 2019, the Mexican government launched its Comprehensive
Development Plan (PID) with Central America, seeking to bolster international commitment to
development in southern Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.65
Despite these pledges, however, development efforts by the United States and Mexico lack coordination in
planning and implementation, thereby limiting their sustainability and success. Through its development
plan, Mexico seeks to invest USD 100 million in social programs to create jobs for unemployed youth and
61 MPI analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data from the 2012–16 ACS pooled and the 2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), drawing on a unique methodology for assigning legal status to noncitizens developed in consultation with
James Bachmeier of Temple University and Jennifer Van Hook of The Pennsylvania State University, Population Research
Institute.
62 INM, “Programa Temporal de Regularización Migratoria,” updated July 4, 2017, www.gob.mx/inm/acciones-y-programas/
programa-temporal-de-regularizacion-migratoria-90502.
63 Governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, “Triángulo Norte: Construyendo Confianza, Creando Oportunidades,”
accessed September 11, 2019, http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=EZSHARE-917344851-14317.
64 Peter J. Meyer, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: An Overview (Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10371.pdf.
65 SRE, “The Foreign Secretary Announces Launch of the Comprehensive Development Plan with Central America at United
Nations,” updated June 19, 2019, www.gob.mx/sre/en/articulos/the-foreign-secretary-announces-the-launch-of-thecomprehensive-development-plan-with-central-america-at-united-nations-205538?idiom=en.
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in rural communities in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.66 These programs may reduce migration
pressures but require sustainable international investment and evaluation. At the same time, the U.S.
commitment to development in Central America remains unclear after President Trump announced
in March 2019 that the United States would be cutting hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to the
region, linking this to criticisms that countries there were failing to control the recent surge in irregular
migration.67

Restoring U.S. aid—and increasing Mexican assistance—is critical. It is unlikely that the U.S. and Mexican
governments will agree on a full menu of options for supporting regional development, but finding two
or three areas of mutual interest in which to invest, in cooperation with local actors and international
institutions, could help maximize their impact. By targeting aid to agreed-upon types of programs, they
could build on each other’s efforts, scale up effective initiatives, and perhaps attract other government
donors.
Comprehensive reintegration programs and services for returning migrants are one key area for
investment. Such programming can help returnees re-establish themselves, build ties to the society,
and reduce the chances of them choosing to emigrate again. Some of the gang prevention and youth
employment programs begun under U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) sponsorship in
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have reported success in lowering gang participation. Targeted
assistance in rural and indigenous communities in Guatemala has also shown promise in alleviating
extreme poverty and increasing resiliency among agricultural workers.68

Finding two or three areas of mutual interest in which to invest,
in cooperation with local actors and international institutions,
could help maximize their impact.
These initiatives can provide important models and lessons learned as policymakers design future
programs. To make this type of systematic learning possible, there is a need for rigorous analysis of
program designs and outcomes. Future aid should therefore build in evaluation mechanisms to measure
and track impact across common indicators, including but not solely on migration.
More data, information, and analyses on migrants’ communities of origin are necessary to understand
the localized drivers of migration and how to address them. As a starting point, it would be helpful
to map existing databases and collection mechanisms to leverage efforts across governments,
international organizations, research institutions, and civil society. For example, matching Mexican and
U.S. apprehension data with research in municipalities of origin could help design much more effective
development strategies in the future.

Efforts to strengthen governance and root out corruption are also critical, especially in Honduras and
Guatemala. Strong support for international commissions that help local attorneys general pursue
corruption investigations, such as the former International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala
66 Misael Zavala, “México Invertirá 100 Millones de Dólares en Centroamérica,” El Universal, June 21, 2019, www.eluniversal.
com.mx/nacion/politica/mexico-invertira-100-millones-de-dolares-en-centroamerica.
67 Lesley Wroughton and Patricia Zengerle, “As Promised, Trump Slashes Aid to Central America over Migrants,” Reuters, June
17, 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-trump/as-promised-trump-slashes-aid-to-central-america-overmigrants-idUSKCN1TI2C7; Meyer, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America.
68 Megan Specia, “Trump Wants to Cut Aid to Central America. Here are Some of the Dozens of U.S.-Funded Programs,” New York
Times, April 2, 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/04/02/world/americas/trump-funding-central-america.html.
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(CICIG)69 and the Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH),70
are critical investments, as is funding for citizen efforts to monitor corruption. The launch of the
International Commission against Impunity in El Salvador (CICIES) in September 2019, with the support
of the Organization of American States, provides another promising mechanism to strengthen governance
and reduce corruption in the region.71
Similarly, as the political crises in Venezuela and Nicaragua deepen and emigration increases, it will be
vital for the U.S. and Mexican governments to coordinate strategy around these movements. While the
United States and Mexico have adopted different approaches to these two hemispheric crises, that should
not prevent active cooperation to ensure that the democratic will of the people can be heard in both
countries and the crises overcome.

IV.

Towards a More Cooperative Approach on Migration

It is hard to see in the current environment—when tensions abound and U.S. and Mexican interests
seem to be diverging so sharply—how the governments of these countries could work closely together
to address migration issues with shared purpose. Yet it is important to note that the United States and
Mexico are already and have long been partners on many of these issues. Over time, the two countries
have also become much closer in their structural relationship to migration. They are, to be sure, not in
the same situation, but they are far more similar than they have ever been before. As a result, migration,
integration, and development policies should reflect this greater convergence of interests.

Much of the conflict plaguing the Mexico-U.S. relationship will not vanish overnight, but both countries
have a clear interest in recognizing their similarities, finding practical ways to learn from each other, and
creating spaces for greater collaboration. Cooperative approaches to migration that emphasize not only
effective enforcement and border management but also legal migration pathways, timely humanitarian
protection, proactive support for integration, and an investment in regional development to address the
drivers of forced migration would go a long way toward helping both countries alleviate some of the
tension and take advantage of the benefits immigration offers.

69 United Nations, “CICIG (International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala),” accessed September 8, 2019, www.
un.org/undpa/es/node/183334. After a series of unsuccessful negotiations between the Guatemalan government and
the United Nations to extend its mandate, CICIG discontinued its operations in September 2019; see Sonia Pérez D., “As
UN Body Wraps Up in Guatemala, Fears for Anti-Graft Fight,” Associated Press, September 2, 2019, www.apnews.com/
b1778efc68fb4b07b746fadb835a9606.
70 Organization of American States (OAS), “Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras,”
accessed September 8, 2019, www.oas.org/en/spa/dsdsm/maccih/new/default.asp.
71 Nelson Renteria, “El Salvador Launches Anti-Corruption Commission, Inspired by Guatemala,” Reuters, September 6, 2019,
www.reuters.com/article/us-el-salvador-corruption/el-salvador-launches-anti-corruption-commission-inspired-byguatemala-idUSKCN1VR2QP.
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Appendix. Study Group on Mexico-U.S. Migration
Members
Francisco Alba Hernández, Professor, El Colegio de México
Jill Anderson, Co-Director, Otros Dreams en Acción

Alan Bersin, former Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection and Assistant Secretary for
Policy and International Affairs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Theresa Cardinal Brown, Director of Immigration Policy, Bipartisan Policy Institute
Manuel Ángel Castillo, Professor, El Colegio de México

Alexandra Délano Alonso, Professor, New School University

Agustín Escobar Latapí, Professor and former President, Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios
Superiores en Antropología Social
Silvia E. Giorguli-Saucedo, President, El Colegio de México*

Gerónimo Gutiérrez Fernández, Former Ambassador of Mexico to the United States
José Luis Gutiérrez Pérez, Secretary of Migration, State of Michoacán
Susan Gzesh, Director, Human Rights Program, University of Chicago

Carlos Heredia Zubieta, Professor, El Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, and former
Mexican Congressman
Mario Hernández, Director, Public Affairs, Western Union

Roberta Jacobson, former U.S. Ambassador to Mexico and Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs
Timothy Kane, Fellow in Immigration Studies, Hoover Institute

Jim Kolbe, former U.S. Congressman and Senior Fellow, German Marshall Fund
Claudia Masferrer, Professor, El Colegio de México*

Doris Meissner, Senior Fellow and Director, U.S. Immigration Policy Program, Migration Policy Institute,
and former Commissioner, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
Gustavo Mohar, former Mexican Undersecretary of Population, Migration, and Religious Affairs
Pia M. Orrenius, Vice President, Dallas Federal Reserve Bank
Rachel Peric, Executive Director, Welcoming America
Juan Pablo Rosas Pérez, Vice President, Rassini
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Andrés Rozental, President, Rozental and Associates and former Deputy Secretary of Foreign
Relations
Ariel G. Ruiz Soto, Associate Policy Analyst, Migration Policy Institute*
Andrew Selee, President, Migration Policy Institute*

Seth Stodder, Partner, Holland & Knight, and former Assistant Secretary for Border, Immigration, and
Trade, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
* = Co-coordinator of the study group

Note: The discussions of the study group shaped the findings of this report, but the authors are solely
responsible for the report’s contents. Study group members were not asked to endorse the report.
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